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Introduction  
If modern modal logic had picked up where mediæval modal logic left off, it would 
have begun with a well-developed distinction corresponding to what in current termi-
nology would be called the distinction between metaphysical and logical necessity1. But as 
history actually unrolled, the technical side of modern modal was elaborated for many 
years before this elementary conceptual distinction became at all widely understood. 
Until the re-evaluation (at present only just begun) of the significance of technical re-
sults in the light of this crucial distinction is completed, existing work in modal logic 
can hardly contribute to the development of a good theory of logical necessity and 
therewith of logical consequence.  
 And even as this re-evaluation begins to be undertaken, there is a danger of its be-
ing muddled by what seems an increasingly widely held view that Kripke models, the 
main technical tool in almost all investigations in modal logic, are appropriate only for 
metaphysical modalities, and that a different notion, Kanger models, is required for 
logical modalities2. The present note reviews the reasons for rejecting this opinion3. §1 
contains needed notational and terminological preliminaries. §2 is an exposition of a 
                                                   
1  See the discussion of consequentiæ  in Kneale and Kneale (1962), pp. 274ff, and especially of the distinc-
tion between formal and material consequence, the latter being, roughly speaking, enthymemes that be-
come formally valid when a metaphysically necessary premise is added. 
2 The work of Kanger alluded to is his dissertation (Kanger (1957)). Until it was recently made available in 
his Collected Works, this item was very difficult to obtain. And the dissertation, once obtained, remains 
very difficult to read, mainly owing an accumulation of non-standard notation and terminology, even 
for notions like reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relations; but fortunately a readable account of 
Kanger’s treatment of modality has recently been provided in Lindström (1998), where related ideas 
are found also in other early writers. 
3 In a recent paper (Burgess (1999)) I had occasion to mention this criticism of Kripke models in passing, 
quoting Jakko Hintikka there, as I will quote him here, as its most prominent and persistent advocate, 
and adding a couple of paragraphs of counter-criticism. Personal communications received since have 
convinced me that Hintikka’s views are more widely shared than I had imagined, making a more de-
tailed criticism of his criticisms desirable. I am especially indebted to Matthew McKeon, who is de-
veloping his own line of response, who brought to my attention in correspondence quite a number of 
published statements of views like Hintikka’s. I have also profitted from correspondence with Sten 
Lindström. 
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line of thought leading to Kripke models, one of which there are traces in Kripke’s 
own early publications4. I hope the exposition may be of some pedagogical value. §3 
sketches an argument why, when necessity is understood as truth by virtue of logical form, 
Kripke’s model theory should boil down to something simpler, and why it should not 
boil down to Kanger’s model theory. §4 indicates how the considerations advanced in 
earlier sections bear on the vexed question of the status of the formula ¯$x $y 
(x ¹ y)5. 
1. Use-mention confusions and how to avoid them   
Before launching into the exposition, some preliminaries are needed. In all but the last 
section of this note, discussion will be confined to the level of sentential or proposi-
tional logic, or as I will call it (in an attempt to remain neutral), the logic of statements. 
Already at this level one frequently finds usages in the literature that invite a confusion 
of use and mention, which has plagued modern modal logic from its first beginnings.  
 Specifically, one often finds the letters p, q, r, and so on, employed in two quite dif-
ferent ways, exemplified by the following: 
 (X)  If p is any statement, then the negation of p is another statement, one which 
is true if p is false and false if p is true, and logically necessary if p is not logi-
cally possible, and logically possible if p is not logically necessary. 
 (Y)  The formula p Ú ~p is valid because on any valuation (that is, any assignment 
of values T and ^ to statement letters p, q, r …) the formula receives the 
value T. The formula p & ~ p is unsatisfiable because there is no valuation on 
which the formula receives the value T6. 
What is the difference here? In (X), p is being used to refer to statements such as 
“Snow is white” or “Grass is green”, and more specifically is being used as a variable 
ranging over such statements. In (Y), p and q and r are being mentioned as components 
out of which formulas are built up with the help of logical symbols such as ~ and & 
and Ú. It would represent a confusion between use and mention, or if you will, be-
tween metalanguage and object language, to speak of formulas as true or false, or as 
logically necessary or logically possible — or inversely, to speak of statements as as-
signed value T or assigned value ^, or as valid or satisfiable.  
 In order to maintain the crucial distinction, it is not obligatory to use some special 
system of quotation and quasi-quotation marks. It is in fact difficult to devise a system 
of punctuation of manageable complexity that would mark all the distinctions there 
                                                   
4 Especially Kripke (1959). To a limited extent, oral comments of Saul Kripke himself have seemed to me 
to confirm that his route to Kripke models was at least had some affinities with the route I will be 
discussing. But while I certainly wish to claim no special originality for this line of thought, neither 
would I wish to saddle Kripke with every opinion I may express in the course of expounding it. 
5 The question is especially pressed in Field (1989), pp. 116ff. 
6 My (X) and (Y) are not direct quotations from any specific writer. But one can find p and q used both as 
I will be using them, and as I will be using a and b, and indeed also as I will be using A and B, 
throughout the crucial chapter VIII of Lewis and Langford (1959). 
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are to be drawn in this area; and the example of mediæval logicians, with their theories 
of suppositio, shows that the subtlest distinctions among different modes of employ-
ment of the same expression can be maintained without the use of any special signs at 
all. Nonetheless, some kind of notational distinction seems desirable as a precaution. 
My own solution will be to use a different style of letter, a, b, g, in contexts like (X), 
that is, for statements, and use the original, p, q, r, only in contexts like (Y), that is, for 
the statement letters out of which formulas are compounded. Besides, I will use a third 
style of letter, A, B, C, for the formulas compounded out of these sentence letters.  
 I will also make a related terminological distinction. The result of replacing the 
statement letters in a formula A with specific statements, such as “Snow is white” or 
“Snow is black” (with simultaneous replacement of logical symbols ~, &, Ú, and so 
on, by the logical operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction, and so on, that 
they are supposed to represent) I will call an instantiation of A. By contrast, I will call 
the result of replacing the statement letters in A by other formulas (whether sentence 
letters or compound formulas), a substitution in A. Thus an instantiation of A is the 
sort of thing that may be logically possible, or actually true, or logically necessary, but 
a substitution in A is the sort of thing that may be satisfiable, or assigned value T by a 
valuation, or valid. 
 Now to ward off all possibility of confusion, there is a further point about state-
ment letters that needs to be made. The standard aim of logicians at least from Russell 
onward has been to characterize the class all formulas all of whose instantiations are true. 
Thus, though Russell was a logical atomist, when he endorsed p Ú ~p as law of logic, 
he did not mean to be committing himself only to the view that the disjunction of any 
logically atomic statement with its negation is true, but rather to be committing himself 
to the view that the disjunction of any statement whatsoever with its negation is true (or, 
to state once explicitly a qualification that will henceforth be tacitly understood, if not 
literally any, at least any within some class closed under the logical operations for which one has 
introduced logical symbols, and hence emphatically not limited to logical atoms). This has 
remained the standard employment of statement letters ever since, not only among 
Russell’s successors in the classical tradition, but also among the great majority of 
formal logicians who have thought classical logic to be in need of additions and/or 
amendments, including C. I. Lewis, the founder of modern modal logic. 
 With such an understanding of the role of statement letters, it is clear that if A is a 
law of logic, and B is any substitution in A, then B also is a law of logic. That is, if all 
instantiations of A are true, and B is a substitution in A, then all instantiations of B are 
true. This is simply because any instantiation of a substitution B is an instantiation of 
the original A. Thus it is that the rule of substitution applies not only in classical logic, 
but in standard, Lewis-style modal logics (as well as in intuitionistic, temporal, rele-
vance, quantum, and other logics).  
 None of this is meant to deny that there may be circumstances where it is legiti-
mate to adopt some other understanding of the role of statement letters. If one does 
so, however, it is indispensable to note the conceptual distinction, and highly advisable 
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to make a notational and terminological distinction7. Above all, it is important to rec-
ognize that one logician’s proposed set G of formulas representing of laws of logic 
cannot be meaningfully compared with another logician’s proposed set D of formulas 
representing of laws of logic, if the two have different understandings of the roles of 
statement letters. If the first logician is adhering to some non-standard understanding 
of that role, and the second logician to the standard one, then it is not G itself but 
rather the set G# of those formulas all substitutions in which are in G that should be 
compared with D8. 
 In the present study there is only one kind of non-standard employment of state-
ment letters that will be of interest. Let us call the result of replacing the statement let-
ters in a formula A by statements an instantiation* if statement letters are replaced by state-
ments that are logically atomic (or, to state explicitly once a qualification that will hence-
forth be tacitly understood, if not literally logically atomic, at least without further logi-
cal structure that can be represented only using whatever logical symbols one is using), and with dis-
tinct sentence are instantiated by statements that are logically independent.. (Here n statements 
a1, … , an are independent if all 2n combinations of truth values are possible.)  
 A formula fully indicates the logical form of its instantiations* (insofar as it can be 
represented with the logical symbols one is using), but not of all its instantiations. For 
example, “Grass is green or snow is white” is an instantiation* of p Ú q, while “Grass 
is green or grass is not green” is an instantiation of p Ú q that is not an instantiation* 
thereof. It is, rather, an instantiation* of p Ú ~p, which is a substitution in p Ú q. There 
are contexts where it is of interest to consider, not the set of formulas all of whose in-
stantiations are true, but rather the set of formulas all of whose instantiations* are 
true9. This amounts to adopting a non-standard understanding of the role of state-
ment letters, which I propose to indicate notationally by starring those letters. In the 
end I will use five styles of letters (a, p, A, p*, A*): for statements; for statement let-
ters in their standard role; for formulas built up therefrom; for statement letters in a 
non-standard role; and for formulas built up therefrom. I fear that with any fewer 
styles of letter that this, there will be a danger of confusion. 
2. The road to Kripke models   
Stage zero. The idea in setting up a model theory is to introduce certain objects called 
models, and a certain relation between formulas and models called holding or being valued 
                                                   
7 Such is done, for instance, by Arthur Prior, in his discussion of future contingents in (1967), chapter 7, 
where in addition to p, q, r for arbitrary statements he introduces a, b, c, for statements not about the fu-
ture. 
8 This point is explained with admirable clarity by J. C. C. McKinsey, (1945), p. 85. 
9 One such context would be in an attempt at a reconstruction of logical atomist thought. Such a recon-
struction has been attempted by Nino Cocchiarella, e.g. in (1984). While critics of Kripke models 
sometimes cite Cocchiarella as if his work supported their position, there is this difference, that the 
critics never acknowledge at all that they are working with a non-standard understanding of the role of statement let-
ters. My counter-criticism will be directed against this lack of acknowledgment. 
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T (as opposed to failing or being valued ^), and to do this in such a way that every for-
mula that holds in all models will have all its instantiations true (soundness)10 and every 
formula all of whose instantiations are true will hold in all models (completeness). Thus 
in characterizing which formulas are laws of logic, the indefinitely large totality of all 
instantiations is replaced by the totality of all models, which may be more tractable, at 
least theoretically, if not practically.  
 In seeking a suitable model theory for modal logic, we begin with classical state-
ment logic, with no modalities. At this level, since whether an instantiation of a for-
mula A is true or not depends only on whether the statements a1, … , an that instan-
tiate the statement letters p1, … , pn in A are true or not, we may simply take as our 
models all valuations or assignments of values T or ^ to statement letters, extending 
any such valuation V to complex formulas according to the usual rules: 
 
(1a) V(~A)  = T if and only if  not V(A) = T 
(2a) V(A & B)  = T if and only if V(A) = T and V(B) = T 
(3a) V(A Ú B)  = T if and only if V(A) = T or V(B) = T 
 
The indefinitely large totatlity of all instantiations is adequately represented (in the 
sense that soundness and completeness hold) by the set of the 2n possible valuations 
of n letters. 
 Stage one. We next allow modalities, but no nesting of modalities, or modalities in-
side modalities. At this level, whether an instantiation of a formula A is true or not 
depends not only on which combination of truth values the statements a1, … , an 
that instantiate the statement letters p1, … , pn in A actually have, but also on which of 
the 2n combinations of truth values are possible.  
 Consider, for example,  
 
A = p1 & p2 & ¯(p1 & ~p2) & ¯(~p1 & p2)  
 
If (i) we take as a1 “Grass is green” and as a2 “Snow is white”, then the instantiation 
of A we obtain is true, but not so if (ii) we take as a1 “Grass is green” and as a2 
“Grass is green or snow is white”, or if (iii) we take as a1 “Grass is green” and as a2 
“Grass is green and snow is white”. In all three cases (i)-(iii) the first two conjuncts 
will be true, but the third will be false in case (ii) and the fourth in case (iii). What we 
need to take for a model at this stage is, therefore, a valuation V0 representing what, 
in a given instantiation, the actual combination of truth values of the relevant state-
ments would be, together with a set R0 of valuations representing the “realm of possibil-
ity”, that is, the possible combinations of truth values of those statements. 
                                                   
10 Specifically, this version of soundness corresponds to the first implication in formula (2) in Mario Go-
mez-Torrente’s (2003) introduction to this symposium: the requirement that every argument that is 
“valid” in the technical sense of preserving truth in all structures, should be genuinely logically valid. 
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 Already perhaps at this stage (and certainly by the next) the notion of model is 
complicated enough that one may wish to draw a picture: a dot representing the actual 
valuation V0 and oval containing many dots, representing the set R0 and the valua-
tions belonging to it. Such a picture, once drawn, suggests a modification of the no-
tion of model, which proves useful when we go on to later stages. With this modifica-
tion, a model consists of a point or index x0, representing actuality, to which is assigned 
a valuation V0 = V(x0) and also a set R0 = R(x0) whose elements are further points or 
indices x to each of which a valuation V(x) is attached. A formula A without modali-
ties will be said to hold or fail, or to have the value T or ^, at a point x if and only if 
does so at the valuation V(x) attached to x. Writing x ú= A to indicate A holds at x, 
we thus have 
 
(0b) x ú= p  if and only if  (V(x))(p) = T 
(1b) x ú= ~A   if and only if  not x ú= A 
(2b) x ú= (A & B)  if and only if x ú= A and x ú= B 
(3b) x ú= (A Ú B)  if and only if x ú= A or x ú= B 
 
And when x is distinguished index x0, representing actuality, we have 
 
(4b) x ú= £A   if and only if y ú= A for all y Î R(x) 
(5b) x ú= ¯A   if and only if y ú= A for some y Î R(x) 
 
for any formula A without modalities. A formula counts as holding or failing in the 
model as a whole according as it holds or fails at the distinguished index x0. 
 Stage two. If we allow nesting of modalities two deep, so that we have modalities in-
side modalities, but no modalities inside modalities inside modalities, then the notion 
of model must be further elaborated. Besides the index x0 representing actuality, with 
its attached valuation V(x0) representing actual truth and its attached set R(x0) repre-
senting the realm of actual possibility, we will need for each x in R(x0), representing an 
actual possibility, not only a valuation V(x) representing truth relative to x but now 
also a set R(x) representing the realm of possibility relative to x. And for any y in any 
R(x), representing a possible possibility, we will need a valuation V(y). The definition 
of holding and failing is unchanged, except that clauses (4b) and (5b) now apply to the 
x in R(x0) as well as x0 provided A contains no modalities, and for x = x0 apply to A 
having modalities but no modalities inside modalities, as well as to A containing no 
modalities. 
 Stage three. It should be clear how the pattern continues as we allow deeper and 
deeper nesting of modalities. If we wish to allow unlimited nesting, we will in the end 
need the following apparatus: a set X indices, a distinguished index x0, an assignment 
of a set R(x) of indices to each index x, and an assignment of a valuation V(x) to each 
index. Clauses (0b)-(5b) above will then define holding or failing at an index in a 
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model, holding or failing the model as a whole being holding or failing at its distin-
guished index.  
 The definition may be restated in terms of the relation Rxy which an index x bears 
to all and only those indices y in R(x). In these terms, a model consists of a set X of 
indices, a distinguished index x0, a two-place relation R on indices, and an assignment 
of a valuation V(x) to each index. Thus the final clauses in the definition above would 
read 
 
(4b) x ú= £P   if and only if y ú= P for all y with Rxy 
(5b) x ú= ¯P   if and only if y ú= P for some y with Rxy 
 
One can similarly replace the assignment of valuations to indices by the a two-place 
function V(x, p) = (V(x))(p) giving the value T or ^ of a statement letter p at an index 
x.   
 It may be noted that we have let go of the idea that every index x should either be 
the distinguished index x0, or be R-related to x0, or be R-related to something 
R-related to x0, and so on. In terms of the heuristic line of thought that has led us this 
far, we are allowing extraneous indices that correspond neither to actuality, nor to ac-
tual possibility, nor to actually possible possibility, and so on. But a little thought 
shows that the presence of extraneous indices makes no difference to whether a for-
mula holds in a model or not. Since the goal in setting up a model theory is not that 
every piece of apparatus in the model should correspond to something in a given heu-
ristic line of thought, but only that holding in all models should in the end coincide 
with having all instantiations true, extraneous indices may be allowed, if that makes 
the definition of model easier to state, as it does.  
 Thus we have arrived at Kripke models in the form in which they are usually pre-
sented in the literature11, apart from the picturesque but potentially misleading termi-
nology (subsequently regretted by Kripke himself) that calls indices possible worlds. 
Note that along the way we have made virtually no assumptions about the kind of ne-
cessity involved. The apparatus is intended to be flexible, and applicable to many 
kinds of necessity, distinctions among different kinds being reflected not in differ-
ences in the basic set-up áX, x0, R, Vñ, but rather in special conditions that may be 
imposed on the relation R. For instance, with alethic modalities, that is, with notions of 
necessity that imply truth, as do both metaphysical and logical necessity, the actual 
state of things must count among the possible states of things, so one will want to im-
pose the condition that each index be in its own “realm of possibility”, that is, x Î 
R(x) or Rxx, making the relation R reflexive. 
3. Hintikka’s fallacy  
Of course, when the model theory was originally introduced, the first task was to cor-
relate various conditions on R with various axioms of modal logic that had been con-
                                                   
11 See for instance the standard reference Bull and Segerberg (1984). 
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sidered in the literature from C. I. Lewis onwards. Of special interest here will be the 
axioms system S5, which implies that every formula with nested modalities is equiva-
lent to one without. As is well known, this system turns out to correspond to impos-
ing the conditions of reflexivity, symmetry, and transivitiy on R, making it an equiva-
lence relation. If extraneous indices are eliminated, as they always may be, we are left 
with models in which all indices are R-related, so that any mention of R may be 
dropped, and we have  
 
(4c) x ú= £A   if and only if y ú= A for all y  
(5c) x ú= ¯A  if and only if y ú= A for some y 
 
In fact, the indices themselves are dispensable and we may go back to working directly 
with valuations. That is, we get equivalent results if we simply take as a model a valua-
tion V0 together with a set R0 of valuations, with V0 Î R0 and we get  
 
(4d) V(£A)  = T if and only if  W(A) = T for all W in R0 
(5d) V(¯A)  = T if and only if  W(A) = T for some W in R0 
 
These clauses make the value of £A or ¯A independent of V, since the righthand 
side of the definition does not mention V. 
 What may in the end be the correct logic of metaphysical modalities is presumably 
a question for metaphysicians, but the determination of the correct logic of logical 
modalities is a question for logicians alone. A good case can be made that, at least 
when logical necessity is understood as truth by virtue of logical form alone (as contrasted 
with, say, verifiability by virtue of logical form alone), S5 is the right system, and the simple 
model theory for it that I have just indicated the right model theory12.  
 The case may be conveniently put by using starred statement letters. One can then 
argue as follows. Let us consider a formula £A*. Its instantiations* will be statements 
 
it is logically necessary that a 
 
where where a is an instantiation* of A*. Now we are understanding the displayed 
condition to mean 
 
any statement b of the same logical form as a is true 
 
                                                   
12 In his introduction, Mario Gomez-Torrente says that the abstract Tarskian method of defining a notion 
of structure, truth in a structure, and consequence as preservation of truth in all structures, can be 
applied to languages with extend those of ordinary logic. The present paper deals, mainly at the level 
of the logic of statements, with the problem of what is the best notion of structure when the exten-
sion adds ‘it is logically necessary that’, and assumes it to be a logical operator, and hence an operator to 
be represented when representing the logical form of statements involving it. The argument to follow 
depends crucially on this assumption. 
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So since a statement b is of the same logical form as an instantiation* a of a formula 
A* if and only if b is also an instantiation* of A*, it follows that an instantiation* of 
£A* will be true if and only if all instantiations* of A are true. Similarly, an instantia-
tion* of ¯A* will be true if and only if some instantiation* of A is true. Since we 
want the totality of models to represent the totality of instantiations*, we will want to 
have 
 
(4e*) V(£A*)  = T if and only if  W(A*) = T for all valuations W 
(5e*) V(¯A*)  = T if and only if  W(A*) = T for some valuation W 
 
(All valuations are relevant because the notion of instantiation* requires that the 
statements replacing distinct statement letters be independent.) Thus we may take a 
model to consist of a valuation V0, representing actuality, and the set R0 of all valua-
tions — or indeed, leaving the latter to be understood, we may take a model to consist 
simply of a valuation V0, the same as for classical statement logic without modalities. 
 This, of course, does not complete the analysis if we are interested in comparing 
our results with the systems of C. I. Lewis and his followers, who adopted the standard 
understanding of the role of statement letters. As we said early on, for meaningful 
comparison to be possible, what we must then consider is not the set G of formulas A 
that are valid according to definitions (4d), (5d), but rather the set G# of formulas P all 
of whose substitutions are valid according to those definitions. And so we must inquire 
what is the effect of substituting formulas A1*, … , An* for the statement letters 
p1, … , pn in a given formula A.  
 Evidently, a given valuation V of the statement letters p1*, … , pn* will give rise to 
a valuation V†(pi) = V(Ai*). Thus a model consisting of a valuation V0 together with 
the set of all valuations will give rise to a model consisting of the valuation V0† to-
gether with the set R0 of all valuations of form W†, which in general will be a proper 
subset of the set of all valuations. (For instance, if A1* is p1* & ~p1*, no valuation W 
will have W†(p1) = T.) Since we want to consider all substitutions, we must consider 
all models obtainable in this way. And thus we are led to the notion of a model con-
sisting of a designated valuation and a set of valuations, with the clauses (4d) and (5d) 
above. The point to notice here is that we were forced to move from considering all 
valuations as in (4e*), (5e*) to considering only all valuations in some designated set R0 by 
a desire to restore the standard understanding of the role of statement letters.  
 At a purely formal level, one could be led to the same move in a quite different 
way, if one wished to retain the non-standard understanding of the role of statement 
letters, but wished to replace the notion of logical necessity by some weaker notion, 
such as metaphysical necessity. The correlative notion of possibility would then be 
stronger, so that while every valuation represents a logical possibility, it may be that 
not every valuation represents a metaphysical possibility, but only those in some dis-
tinguished set R0. Of course, if one maintains, as I have urged, a notational distinction 
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between standard statement letters p and formulas A built up from them on the one 
hand, and non-standard statement letters p* and formulas A* built up from them on 
the other hand, what one would be led to would be, not literally (4d) and (5d) above, 
but rather the following: 
 
(4d*) V(£A*)  = T if and only if  W(A*) = T for all W in R0 
(5d*) V(¯A*)  = T if and only if  W(A*) = T for some W in R0 
 
 Similarly, with the notational distinctions I have been urging, we saw above that a 
case could be made, with logical modalities, for (4e*) and (5e*), based on the fact that 
two special instantiations of the same formula have the same logical form. But no 
such case can be made for 
 
(4e) V(£P)  = T if and only if  W(P) = T for all valuations W  
(5e) V(¯P)  = T if and only if  W(P) = T for some valuations W  
 
since two instantiations of the same formula may have very different logical forms. 
(To cite the extreme example, all statements are instantiations of p, but not all state-
ments have the same logical form.) And indeed (4e) and (5e) are flatly incompatible 
with a standard understanding of the role of statement letters, since they lead to fail-
ures in the rule of substitution. (For ¯p is valid, or valued T in all valuations, while 
¯(p & ~p) is not.) 
 Of course, what is crucial is not that one distinguish notationally between (4d) and 
(4d*), or between (4e) and (4e*), let alone that one adopt the particular starring con-
vention I have used here. What is crucial is that one distinguish conceptually between 
statement letters thought of as representing arbitrary statements, and statement letters 
thought of as representing independent atomic statements. With the former, standard un-
derstanding, the restriction to a subset of all valuations in (4d) and (5d) need have noth-
ing to do with a switch from logical to any kind of non-logical modalities, since it is 
required even for logical modalities, simply a reflection of the fact that with logically 
complex, logically interrelated statements instantiating the statement letters, not all 
combinations of truth values may be logically possible. And with the standard under-
standing, (4e) and (5e) represent a sheer blunder. By contrast, (4e) and (5e) with the 
non-standard understanding of the role of statement letters — which I would write as 
(4e*) and (5e*) — is appropriate for logical modalities; whereas (4d) with the same 
understanding — which I would write (4d*) and (5d*) — will be appropriate for non-
logical modalities, such as metaphysical modalities. 
 This brings us to Kanger. His proposal for a model theory for logical modalities 
amounts, at the level of statement logic, to extending the usual definition from classi-
cal logic by adding clauses (4e) and (5e). He also says, in effect, that if one wanted to 
consider some weaker notion of necessity, the appropriate clauses would be (4d) and 
(5d), or something more elaborate involving a relation R, pointing in the direction of 
Kripke models. 
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 Hintikka, writing after the publication of Kripke’s work, goes further, and explicitly 
criticizes Kripke models as inappropriate for logical modalities precisely insofar as 
they differ from Kanger models for logical modalities by using clauses like (4d) and 
(5d) rather than like (4e) and (5e). On the strength of a very superficial analogy with 
the model theory of second-order logic, he calls Kripke models based on (4d) and (5d) 
“non-standard” and Kanger models based on (4e) and (4f) “standard”. The end result 
is that we find Hintikka writing as follows:  
…in its usual form, the so-called Kripke semantics is not the correct semantics for logical modalities either. 
As has been pointed out repeatedly, Kripke semantics, unlike e.g. the variant possible-worlds treatments by 
Kanger, is analogous to the nonstandard interpretations of higher-order logics, which is not equivalent to the 
intended standard interpretation of these logics. In other words, the so-called Kripke’s semantics does not 
provide us with the right model theory of the logical (conceptual) necessities…13 
 Here Hintikka wholly fails to note that Kripke was working, like vitually every 
other modal logician beginning with C. I. Lewis, with a standard conception of the 
role of statement letters, for which Kanger’s model theory, with its failure of the rule 
of substitution, is wholly inappropriate regardless of the kind of modality involved. 
His criticism of Kripke models is thus fallacious. Hence the title of this section14.  
4. The size of the universe  
So much for modal statement logic. Turning to quantified modal logic, the first prob-
lem one faces in attempting to determine which is the right axiomatic system or the 
right model theory for logical modalities is the difficulty of making sense of quantifica-
tion into context of logical, as contrasted with metaphysical, modality. To make sense 
of this notion one would have to make sense of the notion of an open statement, such 
as “x is green” being logically necessary of a thing, regardless of how or whether that 
things is named or described in language15. 
 This problem, however, seems to pertain only to de re modality, with modalities in-
side quantifiers, and not de dicto modality, with quantifiers inside modalities. Hence one 
might at least hope to settle questions about the latter, more restricted topic. Even 
here, however, there is trouble, at least if identity is admitted. For there has been a 
controversy over the status of the formula 
 
(1) ¯$x $y (x ¹ y) 
 
                                                   
13 Hintikka and Sandu (1995), p.281. As the word “repeatedly” in the quoted passage suggests, similar 
passages can be found in earlier works of Hintikka’s, going all the way back to (1980).   
14 It should be emphasized that the fallacy does not consist simply in being interested in an approach to 
modality that implicitly involves a non-standard conception of the role of variables, as in Kanger 
(1957), but in confusing that approach with more standard approaches, and especially in criticizing 
work based on more standard approaches without recognizing the difference in conception, as in 
Hintikka (1980) and Hintikka and Sandu (1995).  
15 This problem was raised by Quine in response to the very first, purely formal, experiments in combin-
ing quantifiers and modalities. It is argued in Burgess (1998) that Quine’s criticisms have never been 
adequately answered, so far as they pertain specifically to logical modalities. 
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Does this formula represent a law of logic, or not? The question is subtle enough that 
disagreement might be expected in any case, but discussion of the question has unfor-
tunately been further muddled by Hintikka’s and a kindred fallacy, which suggest two 
short, simplistic arguments for an affirmative answer to the question.  
 The first argument begins with the assumption that if one is interested in logical 
modalities, then at the level of statement logic, the correct notion of modal model will 
be the totality of all classical models for statement logic (that is, all valuations), with 
one of these distinguished as representing actuality, and reasons by analogy that at the 
level of quantification theory the correct notion of modal model will again be the to-
tality of classical models, this time for quantification theory, again with one of these 
distinguished. Since the totality of classical models will include ones where 
 
(2)  $x $y (x ¹ y) 
 
holds, (1) will hold in any modal model, or in other words, will be valid.  
 Clearly the initial assumption in this argument is simply Hintikka’s fallacy, and so 
the argument is to be rejected along with the latter. 
 The second argument is that even if there is some finite upper bound on how 
many things there are, pure logic cannot teach us what this bound is, so it remains logi-
cally possible that there are more things than any given bound, and in particular more 
than two. Moreover, the foregoing considerations are themselves logical in character, 
so it is a law of logic that it is logically possible that there are more than two things.  
 The fallacy here resembles Hintikka’s fallacy in that it involves a confusion over 
the role of letters appearing in formulas, only in this case it is not statement letters 
p, q, r, but rather individual variables x, y, z whose role is at issue. That it is logically 
possible for there to be more than two things may be in some sense a law of logic, but 
it is not what (1) represents on a standard understanding of the role of individual vari-
ables, since on such an understanding they do not range over the totality of all things, 
but rather over some non-empty domain or universe of discourse.  
 A third argument now suggests itself. Let us write x+, y+, z+, and so on, for vari-
ables understood as ranging over all things. Then in this notation (1) in effect amounts 
to 
 
(3) $x+ Px+ ® ¯$x+ $y+ (Px+ & Py+ & x+ ¹ y+) 
 
Here the one-place predicate P represents belonging to the domain, and the antece-
dent of (3) corresponds to the standard assumption that the domain is non-empty. 
Now the argument would run that, even without this antecedent, the consequent must 
hold, since  
 
(4) $x+ $y+ (Px+ & Py+ & x+ ¹ y+) 
 
is satisfiable. 
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 This last argument is just Hintikka’s fallacy again. With a standard understanding 
of the role of predicate letters, (3) cannot represent a law of logic unless every substi-
tution does, while clearly the substitution resulting from replacing Px+ by 
 
Qx+ & ~$z+ (Qz+ & z+ ¹ x+) 
 
does not. 
 Whether (1) will represent a law of logic on the standard understanding of the role 
of individual variables depends not on whether it is logically possible for there to exist 
more than one element in the domain of all things, nor yet on whether for any domain 
specified by a logically atomic open statement it is logically possible for there to exist 
more than one element in the domain thus specified, but rather on whether it is the 
case that for any domain it is logically possible that there should be more than two 
elements in it.  
 But what does that mean? The difficulties in making sense of such a condition are 
familiar ones (or the second-order analogues of what at the first-order level are famil-
iar ones). Thus there is no internal logical self-contradiction in the statement 
 
(3) The set of female twentieth-century British prime ministers has more than one 
element. 
 
For it is political history, not pure logic, that teaches us that (3) is false. But by con-
trast, the statement 
 
(4) The set whose one and only element is Margaret Thatcher has more than one ele-
ment. 
 
is a logical absurdity. What, then, are we to say of the domain which is at once the set 
of female twentieth-century British prime ministers and the set whose one and only 
element is Margaret Thatcher? Is “X has more than one element” logically possible of 
it, or not? 
 My aim here is not to argue that the correct answer to this question is negative, any 
more than to argue that the correct answer is affirmative; nor yet is my aim to argue 
that the question is unanswerable. My aim is only to argue that the question of the 
status of (1) cannot be answered by the kind of short, simplistic arguments I have 
been considering, and that any progress on the question will require careful attention 
to the issue of what one conceives the role of various letters and symbols in formulas 
to be. Without close attention to such issues, the advance of modal logic on this and 
other fronts threatens to be derailed by Hintikka’s fallacy and its kin. Confusions of 
metalanguage and object language, of use and mention, against which Quine so early 
and so often warned, remain a danger even today, alas. 
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